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  The	   notion	   of	   an	   individual	   and	   the	   related	   issues	   on	   individuation	   are	   topics	   that	  appear	  in	  the	  philosophical	  discussion	  ever	  since	  the	  antiquity.	  The	  idea	  of	  an	  individual	  thing	   is	   intuitively	   clear:	   an	   individual	   is	   something	   of	   a	   specific	   kind	   that	   is	   a	   unity,	  having	  its	  own	  identity,	  and	  being	  so	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  at	  least	  in	  principle	  to	  discern	  it	  from	  any	  other	  individual,	  even	  of	  similar	  species.	  But	  when	  we	  try	  to	  leave	  the	  intuitive	  realm	   and	   push	   this	   idea	   to	   a	   logical	   analysis,	   we	   find	   a	   cluster	   of	   problems	   that	   are	  difficult	   to	   overcome	   within	   standard	   logico-­‐mathematical	   contexts.	   In	   this	   work,	   we	  shall	  be	  concerned	  with	  some	  aspects	  of	   this	   intuitive	  concept	  of	  an	   individual	  and	  on	  some	   related	   facts	   about	   individuation	   taken	   from	   recent	   discussions	   that	   arose	   ever	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  quantum	  theory,	  pushing	  the	  discussion	  to	  a	  “logical”	  view,	  which	  in	  our	  opinion	  is	  still	  lacking	  in	  the	  usual	  debates	  on	  such	  issues.	  In	  the	  final	  part	  of	  the	  paper,	  we	  propose	  a	  metaphysics	  where	  the	  notion	  of	   identity	   is	  substituted,	   for	  some	  objects,	  by	  a	  weaker	  notion	  of	  indiscernibility,	  and	  we	  try	  to	  justify	  such	  a	  move.	  In	  most	  of	   the	   uses	   of	   the	   expression	   “quantum	   theory”,	   we	   shall	   not	   make	   explicit	   the	  distinction	  between	  the	  non-­‐relativistic	  and	  the	  relativistic	  approaches,	  although	  they	  of	  course	   are	   quite	   different,	   for	   we	   think	   that	   the	   problems	   as	   we	   shall	   present	   them	  appear	  in	  both	  versions.	  But,	  as	  the	  text	  goes,	  the	  context	  will	  distinguish	  between	  them	  and	  these	  questions	  will	  become	  clear	  to	  the	  reader.	  	  
Individuals	  and	  individuation	  	  Intuitively	  speaking,	  by	  an	  individual	  we	  understand	  something	  which	  in	  some	  context	  is	   considered	   as	   one,	   distinct	   from	   any	   other	   individual	   even	   of	   similar	   species,	   and	  which	  can	  at	  least	  in	  principle	  be	  re-­‐identified	  in	  a	  different	  situation	  (within	  the	  same	  context)	   as	   being	   that	   same	   item.	   Some	   authors	   leave	   re-­‐identification	   out	   of	   the	  account,	   claiming	   that	   since	   it	   is	   an	  epistemological	   notion,	   it	   does	   not	  make	  part	   of	   a	  legitimate	   definition	   of	   the	  ontological	  notion	   of	   individual.	   Here	  we	   shall	   not	   discuss	  which	   approach	   is	   preferable,	   but	   we	   shall	   point	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   with	   or	   without	   re-­‐identification,	   some	   interesting	   metaphysical	   consequences	   may	   be	   drawn	   when	   we	  turn	   to	   quantum	   entities	   (see	  Wiggins	   [2012]	   for	   a	   defence	   of	   re-­‐identification	   as	   an	  important	   feature	   of	   individuality).	   In	   expressing	   the	   concept	   the	   way	   we	   have	   done	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  providing	  a	  definition	  of	  an	  individual,	  due	  to	  the	  redundancies	  and	  vagueness	   of	   the	   proposed	   “definition”,	   since	   most	   of	   the	   notions	   employed	   remain	  undefined,	  such	  as	  “distinct”,	  “same”,	  “re-­‐identification”,	  and	  so	  on.	  But	  we	  can	  continue	  with	  this	  informal	  description,	  saying	  that	  an	  individual	  (whenever	  it	  remains	  so)	  has	  an	  
identity,	  that	  it	  has	  individuality,	  being	  different	  from	  any	  other	  individual	  (we	  shall	  take	  for	  granted	  that	  an	  individual	  is	  something	  of	  a	  kind).	  And	  this	  is	  in	  principle	  so.	  In	  our	  view,	   individuals	   may	   be	   entities	   (for	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   better	   word)	   of	   whatever	   sort,	  provided	  that	  they	  fall	  under	  the	  above	  characterization.	  	  	  Notice	  that	  some	  of	  the	  intuitive	  conditions	  for	  individuality	  may	  be	  fail	  in	  some	  cases,	  making	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  item	  in	  question	  is	  not	  an	  individual.	  Thus,	  consider	  the	  example	  of	   an	   isolated	   cloud.	   Taken	   in	   isolation,	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   an	   individual:	   it	   has	   a	   definite	  
identity,	   and	   it	   is	   one.	   However,	   the	   illusion	   is	   dissipated	  when	  we	   consider	   that	   our	  cloud	  sometime	  merges	  with	  other	  clouds	  to	  form	  a	  bigger	  one.	  In	  that	  case,	  it	  loses	  its	  identity,	  and	  we	  cannot	  claim	   that	   there	   is	  a	  determinate	  matter	  of	   fact	  as	   to	  whether	  there	  are,	  say,	  n	  clouds	  which	  happen	  to	  form	  the	  bigger	  one.	  There	  is	  no	  such	  thing,	  and	  so,	  there	  is	  no	  individuality	  for	  clouds.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  the	  content	  of	  a	  portion	  of	   water,	   say,	   which	   at	   first	   can	   be	   thought	   as	   an	   individual	   until	   merging	   the	   other	  portions	  in	  a	  lake,	  when	  its	  “individuality”	  is	  lost	  forever.	  So,	  our	  notion	  of	  individual	  is	  for	   now	   a	   very	   intuitive	   one,	   which	   applies	   to	   some	   things	   and	   does	   not	   applies	   to	  others,	   leaving	   some	  cases	  open.	  And	   this	   is	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  we	   intend	   to	  address	  some	  questions	  concerning	   the	  quantum	  realm;	  we	  claim	  that	  despite	   the	  controversy	  reigning	   nowadays,	   we	   have	   different	   ways	   of	   seeing	   quantum	   objects	   other	   than	  “objects”	   (substances)	   of	   a	   kind.	   Anyway,	   our	   examples	   and	  main	   argumentation	  will	  deal	  with	  “standard	  individuals”,	  that	  is,	  as	  “objects”	  of	  our	  intuition.	  	  	  Thus,	  considering	  identification	  and	  the	  apparent	  individuality	  of	  some	  items,	  even	  if	  we	  don’t	  have	  the	  actual	  means	  for	  pointing	  to	  a	  certain	  individual,	  for	  instance,	  a	  planet	  in	  some	   distant	   galaxy	   not	   seen	   yet,	  we	   still	   believe	   that	   it	   is	   an	   individual,	   and	   that	   its	  individuality	   is	   preserved	   to	   some	   extend,	   which	   apparently	   does	   not	   happen	   with	  clouds	  of	  portions	  of	  water	  (and	  perhaps	  with	  quantum	  objects).	  	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  we	  are	  following	  an	  ant	  entering	  an	  anthill.	  Once	  in	  the	  anthill,	  we	  cannot	  follow	  her	  any	  more	  (by	  hypothesis)	  and	  if	  some	  ants	  now	  leave	  the	  anthill,	  we	  may	  be	  in	  doubt	  if	  some	  particular	  ant	  is	  our	  ant.	  Even	  so,	  we	  believe	  that	  in	  some	  sense	  she	  has	  her	  individuality,	  and	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  ours	  of	  being	  incapable	  of	  distinguishing	  her	  from	  the	  other	  ants.	  But	  we	  can	  mark	  the	  ant	  before	  she	  enters	  the	  anthill,	  say	  with	  a	  little	  mark	  of	  paint	  and	  so,	  when	  some	  ants	  leave	  the	  anthill,	  we	  can	  verify	  whether	  a	  particular	  ant	  is	  or	  is	  not	  our	  ant	  by	  searching	  for	  the	  paint	  mark.	  Contrariwise,	  we	  cannot	  mark	  neither	  a	  cloud	  nor	  the	  content	  of	  a	  portion	  of	  water,	  nor	  a	  quantum	  object	  (here	  and	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  text,	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  quantum	  objects	  we	  use	  “object”	  in	  a	  metaphysically	  neutral	  sense,	  as	  “thing”	  or	  “entity”,	  and	  not	  in	  the	  traditional	  sense	  of	  the	  word	  which	  usually	  commits	   it	   to	   some	   form	  of	   identity	   condition	   for	   the	   items	   to	  which	   it	   applies);	   long	  time	  ago,	   Schrödinger	  made	   the	   remark	   that	   “we	   cannot	  mark	  an	  electron;	  we	   cannot	  paint	  it	  red”	  (Schrödinger	  [1953]).	  According	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  quantum	  theory,	  he	  is	  right.	  Of	  course,	  this	  further	  fact	  is	  not	  once	  again	  grounded	  in	  limitations	  of	  our	  abilities	  or	  of	  our	  technology,	  that	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  we	  cannot	  mark	  an	  electron	  with	  a	  red	  paint	   because	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   so	   with	   our	   current	   technology:	   we	   cannot	   do	   that	  because	   an	   electron	   is	   an	   entity	   such	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   identification	   is	   rendered	  impossible.	  	  The	   search	   for	   a	   Principle	   of	   Individuation	   is	   well	   documented	   in	   the	   philosophical	  literature	   (see	   Quinton	   [1973]	   and	   Lowe	   [2003]	   for	   an	   overview),	   and	   refers	   to	   the	  question:	   “what	   is	   it	   that	   confers	   to	   an	   individual	   its	   individuality?”.	   One	  may	   take	   a	  great	   variety	   of	   approaches	   to	   this	   problem,	   which	   may	   include	   understanding	  individuality	  as	  a	  brute	  undefined	  fact,	  or	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  some	  primitive	  undefined	  identity	   every	   individual	   is	   supposedly	   endowed	  with.	   In	   the	   same	  vein,	  we	  may	  hold	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  individuality,	  so	  that	  no	  principle	  grounding	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  sought.	  In	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning,	  items	  may	  be	  taken	  as	  non-­‐individuals,	  understood	  as	  a	  brute	  undefined	  fact.	  We	  shall	  not	  pursue	  those	  kinds	  of	  approaches	  here	  (but	  see	  our	  discussion	   of	   a	   version	   of	   primitive	   individuality	   related	   to	   quantum	   mechanics	   in	  Arenhart	   and	  Krause	   [2012]).	  Here	  we	   stick	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   individuality	  may	  be	  a	  
defined	   concept,	   because	   this	   line	   of	   approach	   allows	  us	   to	   link	   identity,	   individuality	  and	  indiscernibility	  in	  a	  very	  profitable	  way	  from	  a	  metaphysical	  point	  of	  view	  as	  well	  as	  from	  a	  logical	  point	  of	  view;	  also,	  taking	  those	  notions	  as	  primitive	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  help	  us	  understanding	  them	  unless	  further	  explanations	  are	  provided.	  A	  third	  kind	  of	  answer	  which	  deserves	   to	  be	  mentioned	  could	  perhaps	  be	   summed	  up	   in	   terms	  of	   structures,	  lying	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  ontological	  structural	  realism	  (Rickles	  and	  French	  [2006]).	  Some	  ontological	  structural	  realists,	  the	  ones	  pursuing	  eliminativism	  concerning	  objects,	  dismiss	   the	   discussion	   as	   to	   the	   metaphysical	   nature	   of	   particular	   objects	   as	   ill-­‐grounded,	  since	  they	  take	  particular	  objects	  to	  be	  eliminable	  in	  terms	  of	  relations	  (more	  about	  this	  later).	  The	  relevance	  of	  ontic	  structuralism	  for	  us	  comes	  from	  the	  claim	  by	  its	  proposers	  of	  making	  an	  Aufhebung	  of	  the	  two	  poles	  of	  the	  discussion	  individuality/non-­‐individuality,	  leaving	  only	  structures	  in	  its	  place.	  	  Seen	   as	   a	   defined	   concept,	   there	   are	   two	   basic	   standard	   answers	   to	   the	   problem	  of	   a	  Principle	   of	   Individuality;	   the	   first	   group	   can	   be	   unified	   by	   the	   term	   transcendental	  
individuality,	  while	   the	   second	   group	   falls	   under	   the	   common	  denomination	   of	  bundle	  
theories.	   The	   first	   group	   assumes	   that	   the	   individuality	   of	   a	   thing	   is	   provided	   by	  something	   lying	   behind	   (or	   transcending)	   its	   qualities	   or	   attributes,	   something	   that	  recalls	   the	   Lockean	   concept	   of	   substratum.	   Thus,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   two	   distinct	  individuals	  may	  share	  all	  their	  qualitative	  properties,	  the	  underlying	  substratum	  works	  for	   the	  purpose	  of	  granting	  numerical	   identity	  and	   individuality.	  Also,	   there	   is	  an	  easy	  answer	  to	  property	  change	  and	  transtemporal	  identity:	  an	  individual	  can	  change	  all	   its	  qualities,	  but	  it	  remains	  the	  same	  since	  it	  has	  that	  particular	  substratum,	  something	  that	  does	  not	  change	  and	  which	  makes	  the	  individual	  that	  individual.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  closer	  to	   the	  man-­‐in-­‐the-­‐street	   view	  of	   the	   existence	  of	   the	   soul;	   although	  we	   grow	  old	  with	  time,	  and	  change	  most	  of	  our	  features	  from	  the	  childhood	  to	  the	  adult	  age,	  we	  are	  still	  ourselves	  due	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  quid	  we	  have,	  in	  the	  case,	  our	  souls.	  Obviously,	  we	  have	  employed	  the	  label	  transcendental	  individuality	  since	  it	  allows	  other	  kinds	  of	  approach	  to	   the	   problem,	   not	   only	   the	   substratum	   theory.	   To	   mention	   other	   cases	   of	   such	  approach,	   there	   are	   haecceities	   and	   primitive	   thisness.	   In	   general,	   a	   haecceity	   may	   be	  taken	   to	   be	   a	   non-­qualitative	   property	   each	   item	   possesses	   and	  which	   serves	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  individuation.	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  a	  non-­‐shareable	  property	  which	  lies	  beyond	  the	   items	  qualities	  that	  grants	   individuality	  (there	  are	  distinct	  versions	  of	  haecceitism,	  and	  the	  doctrine	  is	  in	  general	  related	  to	  the	  philosophical	  problem	  of	  identity	  in	  distinct	  possible	  worlds;	   even	   though	   this	   is	   an	   interesting	   problem,	  we	   shall	   not	   deal	  with	   it	  here).	  The	  problems	  with	  those	  kinds	  of	  approaches	  are	  well	  known	  in	  the	  literature:	  we	  need	  to	  explain	  the	  nature	  the	  underlying	  substratum	  (or	  quid,	  or	  haecceity),	  a	  difficult	  task.	  Besides,	  the	  literature	  has	  presented	  good	  argumentation	  against	  its	  existence	  both	  in	  general	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  particular	  case	  of	  quantum	  entities	  (for	  instance,	  see	  Teller	  [1998]).	  	  	  Bundle	  theories,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  do	  not	  suppose	  any	  kind	  of	  underlying	  substratum	  or	  non-­‐qualitative	  properties;	  they	  rather	  see	  a	  particular	  object	  as	  bundle	  of	  properties	  instantiated	  together,	  so	  that	  only	  properties	  are	  needed	  to	  account	  for	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  particular	  object.	  Distinct	  versions	  of	  the	  theory	  arise	  accordingly	  as	  we	  specify	  how	  we	  should	   understand	   the	   “bundle”	  metaphor	   and	   also	   as	   we	   specify	   what	   it	   is	   that	   ties	  together	   the	   properties.	   Just	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   substratum	   theory,	   however,	   the	  bundle	  theory	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  both	  a	  theory	  about	  the	  composition	  of	  particular	  objects	  as	  well	  as	  a	  theory	  about	  their	  individuality.	  In	  this	  last	  sense,	  it	  is	  agreed	  that	  according	  
to	  bundle	  theorists	  the	  individuation	  of	  an	  individual	  is	  provided	  by	  some	  of	  its	  qualities	  or	   by	   a	   group	   of	   qualities.	   But	   this	   view	   has	   also	   problems,	   such	   as:	   can	   two	   distinct	  individuals	  be	  characterized	  by	  exactly	  the	  same	  bundle	  of	  properties?	  If	  we	  claim	  that	  they	   can,	   there	   will	   be	   difficulties	   in	   explaining	   how	   numerical	   distinction	   is	   to	   be	  accounted	  for,	  and,	  some	  have	  claimed,	  some	  resource	  to	  spatial	  location	  will	  have	  to	  be	  made	  (for	  a	  defence	  of	  such	  a	  view,	  see	  Demirli	  [2010]).	  If	  they	  cannot,	  why	  is	  it	  so?	  Here	  too	   we	   encounter	   difficulties,	   for	   we	   need	   to	   assume	   some	  metaphysical	   hypotheses.	  Leibniz	   did	   it	   by	   means	   of	   his	   famous	   Principle	   of	   the	   Identity	   of	   the	   Indiscernibles	  (henceforth,	  PII):	   indiscernible	  entities,	   that	   is,	   those	  which	  share	  all	  of	   their	  qualities,	  are	  in	  fact	  not	  distinct	  entities,	  but	  the	  very	  same	  one.	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  there	  are	  no	  entities	  that	  differ	  solo	  numero.	  Apparently,	  this	  idea	  fits	  quite	  well	  with	  the	  objects	  of	  our	   surroundings,	   for	   we	   never	   find	   two	   objects	   exactly	   alike;	   they	   always	   present	   a	  difference,	   some	  peculiar	   scratch	  or	  marc.	   In	   empirical	   science,	   the	   objects	   treated	  by	  classical	   mechanics	   are	   also	   possibly	   of	   this	   kind;	   they	   may	   share	   most	   of	   their	  properties,	   but	   they	   never	   share	   spatio-­‐temporal	   location;	   thus	   space	   and	   time	   act	   as	  individualizing	   qualities	   in	   classical	   physics.	   Really,	   each	   object	   has	   a	   unique	   spatial	  position	  at	  any	  given	  time	  at	  which	  it	  exists,	  assuming	  as	  it	  is	  usual	  in	  these	  contexts	  that	  classical	  physical	  objects	  are	  impenetrable.	  Of	  course,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  this	  position,	  we	   need	   to	   explain	   the	   nature	   of	   space	   and	   time	   without	   mention	   of	   the	   objects	  inhabiting	   it,	   which	   is	   acknowledged	   to	   be	   a	   difficult	   task.	   Furthermore,	   one	   must	  provide	   good	   grounds	   for	   the	   claim	   that	   spatial	   location	   is	   a	   legitimate	   individuating	  property.	  This	   is	  part	  of	  a	  general	  debate	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  a	   legitimate	  property	   that	  may	   do	   the	   job	   when	  we	   wish	   to	   individuate	   particular	   objects,	   a	   debate	   the	   bundle	  theorist	  will	  surely	  have	  to	  face.	  	  In	  classical	  logic	  (and	  mathematics),	  this	  view	  was	  captured	  for	  instance	  by	  Whitehead	  and	   Russell’s	   definition	   of	   identity	   in	   their	   Principia	   Mathematica	   (Whitehead	   and	  Russell	  [1999],	  p.168),	  and	  standard	  logic	  and	  mathematics	  are	  Leibnizian	  in	  some	  way.	  	  In	  updated	  language,	  their	  definition,	  which	  links	  identity	  (x=y,	  meaning	  “the	  same”,	  “not	  two”,	   etc.)	  with	   indistinguishability	   (agreement	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   attributes)	   can	   be	  put	  as	  follows:	  x=y	  :=	  ∀F(Fx	  ↔	  Fy)),	  where	  F	  is	  a	  variable	  ranging	  over	  the	  collection	  of	  the	   properties	   of	   individuals	   and	   x	   and	   y	   are	   individual	   terms	   (this	   definition	   can	   be	  extended	   for	   other	   levels	   on	   the	   type	   hierarchy).	   Part	   of	   the	   trick	   is	   to	   allow	   that	   the	  property	   “is	   identical	   with	   y”	   be	   in	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   properties	   quantifier	   in	   the	  definition.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  notions	  of	  numerical	  identity	  and	  qualitative	  identity	  are	  sure	  to	  collapse	  into	  one	  and	  the	  same.	  However,	  as	  we	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph	  the	   case	   of	   spatio-­‐temporal	   properties,	   it	   is	   metaphysically	   doubtful	   whether	   such	  properties	  as	  “to	  be	  identical	  with	  y”	  may	  be	  legitimately	  employed	  in	  the	  individuation	  role,	  since	  they	  already	  presuppose	  that	   the	   item	  denoted	  by	  y	   is	  already	   individuated	  and	  available	  to	  somehow	  individuate	  x.	  	  But,	  logically,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  suppose	  the	  existence	  of	  entities	  differing	  solo	  numero,	  that	  is,	  non-­‐identical	  objects	  which	  are	  qualitatively	   indistinguishable.	  By	  the	  way,	   this	  was	  precisely	   the	   argumentation	   presented	   by	   Ramsey	   against	   Whitehead	   and	   Russell’s	  definition,	  qualifying	  it	  as	  a	  “serious	  defect	  in	  Principia	  Mathematica	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  identity”	   (Ramsey	   [1968],	   p.28];	  Wittgenstein	  made	   similar	   remarks	   in	   the	  Tractatus,	  proposition	  5.5302).	  Classical	   logic	   and	   standard	  mathematics	   are	   typically	  Leibnizian	  theories;	   within	   their	   scope,	   there	   is	   no	   place	   for	   indiscernible	   (indistinguishable)	  distinct	   entities.	   In	   order	   to	   consider	   indiscernible	   things	   within	   a	   “standard”	  
mathematical	   context,	  we	  need	   to	  make	   some	  mathematical	   tricks	  we	   shall	   see	  below	  (but	   let	  us	  remark	  that	   these	  moves	  do	  not	  conduce	  to	  truly	   indiscernible	  entities,	  but	  just	   mimic	   the	   concept).	   Surprisingly	   enough,	   this	   fact	   is	   not	   obvious	   for	   most	  philosophers.	  	  	  For	  completeness,	  we	  shall	  mention	  ontic	  structural	  realism,	  considered	  here	  in	  its	  most	  metaphysically	   revisionary	   form,	   that	   is,	   as	   a	   form	   of	   eliminativism	   concerning	  particular	  objects.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  theory	  about	  individuation,	  since	  it	  is	  not	  a	  theory	  about	  particular	  objects,	  but	  is	  a	  supposed	  way	  to	  overcome	  the	  problem	  of	  individuation.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  objects	  should	  be	  reconceived	  as	  placeholders	  in	  structures,	  as	  the	  nodes	  of	  the	  relations	  composing	  the	  structure.	  However,	  if	  we	  try	  to	  push	  those	  heuristic	  ideas	  to	  a	  rigorous	  form	  we	  begin	  to	  see	  the	  trouble.	  Firstly,	  the	  general	  thesis	  says	  (roughly	  speaking)	   that	   the	  world	   is	   a	   structure,	   and	   that	   everything	   there	   is,	   is	   structure.	  We	  agree	   that	   the	  world	  or,	  better,	   the	  portions	  of	   the	  world	  we	  are	   interested	   in,	   can	  be	  “structured”	  generally	  by	  mathematical	  means;	   this	   is	  what	  we	  do	  when	  we	  construct	  our	  theories.	  But	  the	  defender	  of	  the	  structuralist	  view	  wishes	  more:	  as	  we	  mentioned,	  the	  underlying	  ontology	  is	  to	  be	  changed	  from	  an	  ontology	  of	  objects	  (of	  some	  kind)	  to	  an	  ontology	  of	  structures,	  “typically	  conceived	  in	  terms	  of	  relations”	  (Ladyman	  [1998],	  Rickles	  and	  French	  [2006],	  p.25).	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  defenders	  of	  such	  a	  view	  don’t	  explain	  what	  a	  structure	  is.	  Since	  the	  secondary	  existence	  of	  objects	  is	  to	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  relations	  they	  enter	  in,	  the	  relations	  must	  explain	  the	  relata	  (the	  reference	  to	  objects	  related	  by	  the	  relations	  from	  whom	  the	  structure	  is	  “composed”),	  not	  vice-­‐versa,	  so	  that	  they	  claim	  we	  should	  eliminate	  the	  relata	   from	  these	  relations.	  But	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  see	  how	  they	  can	  do	  that	  in	  a	  standard	  framework	  such	  as	  the	  Zermelo-­‐Fraenkel	  set	  theory	  (ZF),	  which	  can	  be	  taken	  (and	  it	  is	  usually	  taken	  by	  philosophers	  too)	  as	  our	  paradigm	  of	  a	  mathematical	  basic	  logical	  theory.	   	  Elsewhere,	  one	  of	  us	  (DK)	  suggested	  that	  perhaps	  Tarski’s	   set	   theory	  based	  on	  his	  calculus	  of	   relations	   (a	  set	   theory	  without	  variables	  –Tarski	  and	  Givant	  [1987])	  may	  be	  useful	  in	  this	  issue,	  but	  as	  far	  as	  we	  know,	  no	  one	  has	  pushed	  such	  a	  view	  to	  something	  interesting	  for	  the	  structuralist	  yet.	  Furthermore,	  if	  the	  world	  is	  a	  structure,	  which	  kind	  of	  structure	  is	  the	  world?	  	  Where	  can	  we	  construct	  such	  a	  structure,	  conceived	  in	  terms	  of	  relations,	  out	  of	  relata?	  By	  these	  reasons,	  we	  regard	  this	  view	  as	  (still)	  ill	  funded,	  yet	  philosophically	  interesting.	  	  	  
Some	  terminology	  and	  questionings	  	  Let	  us	  fix	  some	  terminology.	  We	  say	  that	  two	  objects	  a	  and	  b	  are	  numerically	  distinct	   if	  they	  differ	  numerically,	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  are	  any	  differences	  in	  their	  qualities.	  Thus,	  if	  a	  and	  b	  are	  numerically	  distinct	  objects,	  then	  they	  are	  two,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  matter	   of	   debate	  whether	   this	   difference	   always	   is	   (or	   can	  or	   should	  be)	   grounded	   in	  qualitative	   differences,	   or	  whether	   a	   bare	   numerical	   difference	   is	   enough	   (the	   reader	  should	  acknowledge	  the	  lack	  of	  precision	  in	  this	  definition).	  We	  say	  that	  two	  objects	  are	  
indiscernible,	   or	   indistinguishable	   relatively	   to	   a	   certain	   set	   of	   properties	   (which	  may	  involve	   relations)	   if	   they	   agree	   in	   all	   these	   properties	   and	   are	   related	   by	   the	   same	  relations	  to	  all	  the	  same	  items.	  This	  definition	  is	  better	  than	  the	  previous	  one,	  once	  we	  know	  what	  properties	  and	  relations	  are.	   Identity,	  written	  a=b,	  means	   that	  a	   and	  b	   are	  
the	  very	  same	  object,	  that	  is,	  there	  is	  no	  more	  than	  one	  entity,	  which	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  differently	   as	   either	  a	   or	  b.	   As	  we	   shall	   see	   soon,	   definitions	   such	   as	   these	   cannot	   be	  given	   in	   precise	   terms	   without	   reference	   to	   an	   underlying	   logico-­‐mathematical	   (and	  perhaps	  physical)	   framework.	  Now,	   let	  us	   turn	   to	   the	  standard	  (or	  classical)	   theory	  of	  
identity	   (henceforth,	   STI),	   so	   that	   some	   of	   those	   intuitive	   notions	   may	   be	   put	   more	  clearly.	  	  We	   should	   note,	   as	   indicated	   above,	   that	   we	   have	   a	   problem	   with	   the	   notion	   of	  “property”.	  What	   is	   a	   property?	   In	   quantum	   physics	   the	   notion	   of	   property	   is	   a	   very	  problematical	   one,	   with	   the	   issue	   acquiring	   different	   meanings	   in	   distinct	  interpretations	  of	  the	  theory	  (and	  we	  shall	  not	  try	  to	  explore	  the	  problem	  in	  its	  whole	  extent	  here).	  The	  main	  problem	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  we	  cannot	  take	  a	  naïve	  realist	  position	  that	  quantum	  entities	  are	  property	  bearers	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  everyday	  objects	  are.	  If	  we	  assume	  that	  a	  quantum	  object,	  say	  an	  electron,	  “has	  the	  property	  of	  having	  a	  value	  of	  spin”	  in	  a	  certain	  direction,	  even	  though	  we	  admit	  that	  we	  can	  know	  its	  value	  only	  after	  measurement,	  we	  shall	  be	  committed	  to	  a	  realistic	  position	  similar	   to	  Einstein’s	   in	   the	  infamous	   EPR	   experiment.	   Thus,	   if	   we	   adopt,	   say,	   some	   variant	   of	   the	   Copenhagen	  interpretation,	  we	  surely	  cannot	  say	  that	  the	  electron	  has	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  spin	  attributed	  to	  it,	  unless	  a	  measurement	  is	  made.	  Worst,	  we	  cannot	  even	  speak	  with	  significance	  of	  “the	   electron”.	   In	   a	   certain	   sense,	   the	   electron	   exists	   as	   an	   entity	   bearing	   properties	  definitely	  only	   in	   the	  measurement	  processes.	   In	   this	  particular	   case,	   how	  can	  we	   say	  that	   it	  has	   identity?	  To	  have	  an	  identity	   is,	   in	  some	  sense,	  similar	  as	  to	  have	  a	  value	  of	  spin	  out	  of	  a	  measurement.	  To	  assume	  such	  a	  view	  entails	  a	  metaphysical	  hypothesis	  we	  aim	   to	   criticize	   below.	   Thus,	   we	   need	   to	   distinguish	   between	   “property”	   in	   a	   logical	  setting	  and	  “property”	  in	  a	  physical	  context.	  	  	  Informally,	  a	  property	  is	  an	  attribute	  of	  a	  thing,	  something	  we	  can	  ascribe	  to	  it	  or	  deny	  of	  it.	  But	  in	  this	  case	  we	  need	  to	  have	  the	  thing	  first,	  except	  if	  we	  adopt	  a	  bundle	  view.	  But	  anyway	   we	   need	   to	   sharpen	   the	   concept.	   In	   the	   same	   vein,	   within	   the	   formalism	   of	  quantum	  mechanics,	  a	  property	  is	  something	  we	  can	  attribute	  to	  a	  physical	  system	  in	  a	  certain	  state	  described	  by	   its	  wave-­‐function	  ψ.	  Depending	  on	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	  theory	  we	  adopt,	  and	   in	  particular	  on	  how	  we	  see	  the	  eigenvalue-­‐eigenvector	   link,	   the	  issue	  will	  take	  a	  distinct	  form.	  Some	  believe	  a	  system	  has	  a	  property	  represented	  by	  the	  eigenvalue	   of	   a	   Hermitian	   operator	   if	   and	   only	   if	   the	   system	   is	   in	   its	   corresponding	  eigenstate.	   Others	   believe	   that	   the	   link	   is	   weaker,	   that	   is,	   that	   if	   a	   system	   is	   in	   the	  eigenstate	   of	   a	   Hermitian	   operator,	   then	   it	   has	   the	   property	   represented	   by	   the	  corresponding	  eigenvalue	  of	  the	  operator.	  This	  second	  option	  leaves	  open	  the	  matter	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  system	  may	  bear	  properties	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  in	  an	  eigenstate,	  as	  some	  modal	  interpretations	  of	   the	   theory	   seem	   to	  hold.	  Of	   course,	   even	  modal	   interpretations	   and	  others	  with	  a	  more	  realistic	  flavour	  than	  the	  Copenhagen	  interpretation	  will	  have	  to	  deal	  with	   issues	   like	  non-­‐commuting	  observables,	  contextuality,	  and	  the	   like,	  which	   impose	  serious	   restrictions	   on	   a	   naïve	   understanding	   of	   properties	   in	   quantum	   mechanics.	  Anyway,	  the	  theory	  allows	  us	  to	  calculate	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  value	  (an	  eingenvalue)	  of	  some	  observable	  (a	  Hermitian	  operator)	  for	  the	  system	  in	  a	  certain	  state	  lies	  inside	  a	  certain	   Borelian.	   	   And	   this	   is	   given	   by	   Born’s	   rule,	   as	   is	   well	   known	   (and	   alternative	  interpretations	   will	   have	   to	   reproduce	   this	   probability	   attribution	   of	   the	   standard	  mathematical	  formalism).	  	  	  But	  in	  logic,	  for	  instance	  in	  stating	  the	  above	  Leibniz	  Law,	  we	  regard	  a	  property	  simply	  as	  a	  formula	  with	  just	  one	  free	  variable.	  Assuming	  classical	  logic,	  as	  we	  are	  here,	  given	  such	  a	  property	  denoted	  by	  P	  each	  object	  a	  either	  has	   it	  or	  not.	   It	   is	  difficult	   to	  merge	  this	   view	  with	   the	   above	   (very	   brief)	   discussion	   on	   properties	   in	   the	   quantum	  world.	  Worst,	   the	   issue	   becomes	   complicated	   if	   we	   aim	   at	   to	   consider	   spatio-­‐temporal	  
“properties”.	  Which	  kind	  of	  space	  and	  time	  are	  we	  speaking	  of?	  Would	  it	  be	  the	  standard	  absolute	  view,	  typical	  of	  non-­‐relativistic	  quantum	  theory,	  or	  perhaps	  the	  space-­‐time	  of	  (special)	   relativistic	   quantum	  mechanics?	  Whatever	  move	  we	   chose	   to	   do	  we	   tend	   to	  conform	  ourselves	  with	   the	   standard	  mathematical	   (and	   logical!)	   framework,	   and	   this	  framework	   encompasses	   Leibniz’s	   identity	   in	   some	  way	   or	   another.	   So,	   let	   us	   turn	   to	  consider	  it	  a	  little	  bit.	  	  	  
The	  standard	  theory	  of	  identity	  (STI)	  in	  a	  nutshell	  	  By	  the	  classical	  (or	  standard)	  theory	  of	  identity	  we	  understand	  the	  theory	  of	  identity	  of	  	  standard	   classical	   logic	   and	   mathematics,	   and	   by	   this	   we	   understand	   that	   portion	   of	  present	  day	  mathematics	   that	  can	  be	  built	  within	   the	   first	  order	  Zermelo-­‐Fraenkel	   set	  theory.	  Of	  course	  we	  could	  admit	  alternatives,	  say	  by	  using	  another	  set	  theory,	  a	  higher-­‐order	  logic,	  or	  even	  category	  theory.	  In	  all	  these	  alternatives,	  the	  particular	  STI	  could	  be	  a	   little	  bit	  different,	  but	  at	   the	  bottom	  all	  of	   them	  say	   the	  same:	   these	   frameworks	  are	  
Leibnizian.	  Depending	  on	  the	  framework	  we	  are	  working	  with,	  STI	  is	  formulated	  with	  its	  peculiarities,	   and	   Leibnizianism	  manifests	   itself	   accordingly.	   Let	   us	   see	   in	  what	   sense	  that	  happens	  in	  the	  most	  usual	  frameworks.	  	  To	  consider	  the	  case	  of	  a	  first-­‐order	  setting	  first,	  we	  usually	  regard	  the	  binary	  predicate	  of	  identity	  “=”	  as	  a	  primitive	  concept	  subjected	  to	  the	  following	  postulates:	  (Reflexivity)	  every	   object	   is	   identical	   to	   itself;	   in	   symbols,	   ∀x(x=x),	   and	   (Substitutivity)	   identical	  objects	  may	  be	  substituted	  one	  each	  other	  salva	  veritate;	  in	  symbols,	  ∀x∀y(x=y	  →	  (α(x)	  
→	  α(y))),	  where	  α(x)	   is	  a	   formula	  where	  x	  appears	  free	  and	  α(y)	  results	   from	  α(x)	  by	  substituting	  y	  in	  some	  free	  occurrences	  of	  x,	  being	  y	  a	  variable	  distinct	  from	  x.	  It	  results	  from	  those	   two	  postulates	   that	   the	   relation	   “=”	   is	  also	  symmetric	  and	   transitive.	   In	  an	  extensional	   set	   theory,	   such	   as	   ZF,	   these	   axioms	   are	   supplemented	   by	   the	   Axiom	   of	  Extensionality,	   which	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   converse	   of	   the	   substitutivity	   law,	   namely,	  
∀x∀y(∀z(z∈x	  ↔	  z∈y)	  →	  x=y),	  which	  says	  that	  sets	  with	  the	  same	  elements	  are	  the	  very	  same	  set.	   	  If	  the	  set	  theory	  involves	  ur-­‐elements,	  that	  is,	  objects	  which	  are	  not	  sets	  but	  can	  be	  members	  of	  sets,	  then	  the	  axiom	  of	  extensionality	  reads	  ∀Sx∀Sy(∀z(z∈x	  ↔	  z∈y)	  
→	  x=y),	  where	  S	   is	  a	  predicate	  saying	  that	  something	  is	  a	  set	  (and	  not	  an	  ur-­‐element),	  and	  ∀Sw	  α(w)	  stands	  for	  	  ∀w(Sw	  →	  α(w)).	  	  	  In	   higher	   order	   logic,	   identity	   can	   be	   defined.	   The	   definition	   is	   Leibniz	   Law	   stated	  earlier,	  namely,	  x=y	  :=	  ∀F(Fx	  ↔	  Fy).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remark	  about	  some	  consequences	  of	  these	  postulates	  and	  definitions.	  	  
(I)	   Sometimes	   the	   first-­‐order	   language	   involves	   a	   finite	   number	   of	   predicate	   constant	  symbols	  only	  (and	  here	  we	  shall	  be	  concerned	  with	  predicate	  symbols	  and	  neither	  with	  individual	  constants	  nor	  functional	  symbols).	  In	  this	  case,	  we	  can	  define	  identity	  by	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  the	  predicates	  as	  follows:	  let	  P	  and	  Q	  be	  the	  only	  predicates,	  a	  unary	  and	  a	  binary	  one,	  respectively.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  give	  the	  following	  definition:	  	   x=y	  :=	  (Px	  ↔	  Py)	  ∧	  ∀z((Q(x,z)↔	  Q(y,z))	  ∧	  (Q(z,x)	  ↔	  Q(z,y)))	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	   is	   essentially	   Quine’s	   strategy	   (Quine	   [1986],	   	   see	   also	   Ketland	   [2006]),	   but	   it	   is	  reputed	  to	  Hilbert	  and	  Bernays.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  even	  though	  this	  definition	  is	  reflexive	   and	   a	   version	   of	   the	   substitution	   law	   holds,	   it	   provides	   only	   a	   definition	   of	  indiscernibility	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  primitive	  predicates	  of	  the	  language,	  and	  not	  identity	  
properly	  speaking	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  our	  informal	  characterization	  given	  above).	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  present	  a	  structure	  with	  two	  distinct	  objects	  that	  obey	  this	  definition,	  that	  is,	  that	   are	   “identical”	   according	   to	   this	   definition.	   Just	   think	   of	   a	   domain	   composed	   of	  straight	  lines	  in	  the	  Cartesian	  plan	  and	  let	  P	  stand	  for	  “to	  have	  null	  slope”,	  while	  Q	  stands	  for	   “to	   be	   parallel	   to”.	   Thus	   any	   two	   horizontal	   lines	   are	   “identical”	   according	   to	   this	  definition,	   even	   though	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   that	   they	   may	   be	   distinct	   straight	   lines.	   So,	  although	  the	  language	  cannot	  discern	  then,	  this	  fact	  does	  not	  make	  then	  identical	  in	  the	  sense	  exemplified	  above	  (to	  be	  “the	  same”	  object).	  This	  definition	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  the	  theory	  of	  identity	  given	  above,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  satisfying	  the	  reflexivity	  law	  and	  the	   substitution	   law,	   but	   we	   prefer	   to	   call	   the	   defined	   relation	   “indiscernibility	   with	  respect	  to	  the	  primitive	  predicates	  of	  the	  language”.	  	  	  
(II)	  Even	  Leibniz	  Law	  can	  also	  be	  valid	  in	  certain	  interpretations,	  although	  the	  involved	  objects	  are	  not	  identical.	  In	  fact,	  think	  of	  a	  second	  order	  language,	  endowed	  with	  Henkin	  style	  semantics.	  As	  is	  well	  known,	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  semantics,	  monadic	  predicate	  variables	  do	   not	   have	   as	   their	   possible	   range	   of	   values	   all	   the	   subsets	   of	   the	   elements	   of	   the	  domain;	   rather,	   we	   restrict	   the	   range	   to	   only	   some	   of	   such	   subsets.	   Thus,	   we	   may	  envisage	  situations	   in	  which	  we	  have	  two	  (seen	  from	  the	  outside)	  distinct	  objects	  that	  agree	  in	  all	  the	  chosen	  predicates,	  for	  they	  may	  belong	  to	  all	  the	  subsets	  of	  the	  domain	  taken	   in	   consideration	   in	   our	   semantics	   (for	   details,	   see	   French	   and	   Krause	   [2006],	  p.257).	   	   From	   the	   semantic	  point	   of	   view,	   the	  only	  way	   to	   vindicate	  Leibniz	  Law	   is	   to	  take	  into	  account	  all	  the	  subsets	  of	  the	  domain,	  for	  in	  this	  case	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  all	  singletons,	   and	   they	   make	   the	   difference	   (see	   below).	   In	   that	   case,	   however,	   some	  important	  results,	  such	  as	  completeness,	  no	  longer	  hold.	  	  	  
(III)	  Some	  philosophers	  say	  that	  even	  within	  a	  logical	  framework	  containing	  the	  above	  theory	  of	  identity	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  speak	  of	  weakly	  discriminable	  objects,	  that	  is,	  objects	  that	   obey	   an	   irreflexive	   and	   symmetric	   relation	   (see	   Muller	   and	   Saunders	   [2008]).	  Furthermore,	   those	   philosophers	   claim	   that	   some	   objects,	   as	   for	   example	   quantum	  entities,	  may	  be	  such	  that	  they	  are	  only	  weakly	  discriminable,	  so	  that	  we	  may	  not	  speak	  about	   absolutely	   discriminable	   objects,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   there	   are	   no	   monadic	  predicates	  that	  distinguish	  them.	  A	  typical	  example	  taken	  from	  quantum	  physics	  would	  be	  the	  two	  electrons	  of	  a	  Helium	  atom	  in	  its	  fundamental	  state.	  The	  relation	  could	  be	  “to	  have	  spin	  opposite	   to”.	   It	   is	  a	  physical	   fact	   that	  no	  electron	  has	  spin	  opposite	   to	   itself,	  and	   that	   the	   two	   considered	   electrons	   have	   opposite	   spins.	   So,	   they	   are	   weakly	  discriminable.	  But	  can	  we	  assure	  that	  there	  are	  no	  monadic	  predicates	  involved?	  That	  is,	  can	  we	  grant	  that	  they	  are	  not	  also	  absolutely	  discriminable?	  As	  our	  previous	  discussion	  shows,	   it	   depends	   on	  what	  we	   call	   a	   “property”.	  Within	   the	   framework	   of	   ZF,	   and	   by	  hypothesis	  we	  may	  assume	   it	   as	  our	  underlying	   logic,	  we	  can	   reason	  as	   follows.	   If	  we	  have	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  objects,	  say	  the	  two	  electrons	  (apparently,	  physics	  does	  not	  need	  more	  than	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  physical	  objects),	  we	  can	  always	  name	  them,	  so	  enlarging	  the	  language	  of	  ZF	  with	  new	  constants	  a	  and	  b	  to	  name	  the	  two	  electrons.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  define	  the	  “properties”	  (formulae	  with	  just	  one	  free	  variable)	  Ia(x)	  :=	  x	  ∈	  {a},	  Ib(x)	  :=	  x	  ∈	  {b},	   and	   so	   on,	   depending	   on	   the	   objects	   we	   have	   (in	   a	   finite	   number).	   So,	   it	   is	   a	  consequence	  of	  the	  axioms	  of	  ZF	  that	  in	  being	  a	  and	  b	  two	  objects,	  Ia(a)	  but	  ¬Ia(b).	  Thus,	  they	   are	   discerned	   by	   a	  monadic	   property,	   and	   this	   happens	   for	   any	   object	   in	   ZF.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  objects	  of	  ZF	  are	  individuals.	  	  	  
Some	  philosophers	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  defined	  property	   is	  not	  a	  “property”	  at	  all,	   for	  membership	  is	  a	  relation.	  But	  once	  we	  accept	  our	  above	  characterization	  of	  a	  property	  as	  a	  formula	  (of	  the	  language	  of	  ZF)	  with	  one	  free	  variable,	  we	  have	  no	  reasons	  to	  refuse	  the	   given	   definitions.	   We	   shall	   turn	   to	   this	   point	   below	   (see	   also	   Krause	   [2010]	   and	  Arenhart	  [2012]	  for	  further	  discussion	  on	  weak	  discriminability).	  	  	  
(IV)	  The	  above	  conclusions	  have	  the	  following	  consequence.	  In	  a	  recent	  paper,	  Jonathan	  Lowe	  defined	  an	  individual	  as	  an	  x	  such	  that:	  “(1)	  x	  determinately	  counts	  as	  one	  entity	  and	   (2)	   x	   has	   a	   determinate	   identity.”	   (Lowe	   [2012]).	   We	   shall	   not	   discuss	   Lowe’s	  interesting	  paper	  in	  full	  here,	  but	  just	  remark	  that	  we	  can	  (so	  we	  suppose)	  interpret	  his	  claims	   as	   follows,	   again	  within	   the	   ZF	   setting	   (we	   insist	   that	  we	  need	   to	   consider	   the	  logical	  framework	  for	  certain	  discussions).	  For	  an	  entity	  to	  be	  a	  one	  may	  mean	  that	  we	  can	  always	  form	  the	  unitary	  set	  of	  this	  entity	  and	  such	  a	  set	  has	  cardinal	  1.	  This	  is	  a	  way	  to	  say	  that	  the	  object	  which	  is	  the	  (only)	  member	  of	  this	  set	  is	  a	  one.	  And	  this	  is	  so	  with	  every	  object	  in	  ZF	  due	  to	  the	  pair	  axiom	  and	  the	  definition	  of	  cardinal	  (but	  see	  the	  next	  section).	  The	  second	  clause	  can	  be	  read	  as	  indicating	  that	  x	  obeys	  the	  standard	  theory	  of	  identity	   exposed	   above.	   Thus,	   it	   results	   that	   all	   ZF	   objects	   are	   individuals	   in	   Lowe’s	  sense.	  This	  conclusion	  matters,	  for	  Lowe	  is	  just	  trying	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  non-­‐individuals	   exist,	   that	   is,	   objects	   the	   fail	   to	   obey	   either	   (1)	   or	   (2)	   or	   both.	   But	   this	  hypothesis	  cannot	  be	  performed	  in	  whatever	  theory	  encompassing	  the	  standard	  theory	  of	   identity.	   In	   order	   to	  have	   “legitimate”	   non-­‐individuals	   (and	  we	   shall	   see	   soon	  what	  this	  means),	  we	  need	  to	  change	  the	  logical	  framework,	  although	  in	  ZF	  we	  can	  have	  mock	  non-­‐individuals.	  	  	  
V-­-­	   The	   problem	  with	   a	   framework	   such	   as	   ZF	   is	   that	   there	   may	   be	   individuals	   that	  cannot	  be	  defined	  by	  a	  formula	  of	  the	  language	  and,	  in	  particular,	  cannot	  be	  described	  in	  the	   language;	   that	   is,	   they	   cannot	   be	   named.	   But	   even	   so	   they	   are	   individuals	   in	   the	  above	  sense	  due	  to	  the	  underlying	  logic:	  they	  are	  one	  and	  have	  a	  well	  defined	  identity	  as	  objects	  of	  ZF.	  Let	  us	  give	  an	  example.	  Due	  to	  the	  axiom	  of	  choice,	  we	  can	  prove	  in	  ZF	  that	  there	  is	  a	  well-­‐ordering	  over	  any	  set	  A.	  A	  well-­‐ordering	  is	  a	  partial	  order	  such	  that	  any	  non-­‐empty	   subset	   of	   A	   has	   a	   first	   element	   relative	   to	   the	   well	   ordering,	   that	   is,	   an	  element	   less	   than	   any	   other	   element	   of	   the	   set	   (in	   the	   given	   well-­‐ordering).	   So,	   in	  particular	   there	   is	  a	  well-­‐ordering	  on	   the	  set	  ℜ	  of	   the	  real	  numbers	   (in	   fact,	   there	  are	  infinitely	  many	  of	  them).	  Thus,	  the	  interval	  (0,1),	  described	  in	  the	  usual	  order,	  has	  a	  first	  element,	  which	  is	  different	  from	  any	  other	  real	  number.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  point	  to	  the	  difference,	  for	  the	  well-­‐ordering	  (really,	  any	  well-­‐ordering)	  on	  ℜ	  cannot	  be	  described	  by	  a	  formula	  of	  the	  language	  of	  ZF,	  nor	  the	  first	  element	  of	  any	  non-­‐empty	  set	  can	   be	   named.	   Really,	   we	   could	   “name”	   it,	   say,	   t.	   But,	   what	   is	   t?	   Without	   the	   well	  ordering,	  we	   cannot	   say	   that	  with	   sense,	   for	  we	  would	  need	   to	   stress	   that	  ∀x(x∈X	  →	  
tRx),	   being	   X	   the	   non-­‐empty	   subset,	   and	   being	   R	   the	   well	   ordering;	   but,	   without	   a	  definition	  of	  R,	  this	  expression	  cannot	  be	  a	  theorem	  of	  ZF.	  Even	  so,	  as	  we	  have	  said,	  the	  first	  elements	  of	  the	  non-­‐empty	  subsets	  X	  of	  ℜ	  are	  individuals,	  having	  an	  identity	  as	  all	  real	  numbers	  have.	  	  	  Thus,	  in	  considering	  the	  Max	  Black’s	  widely	  famous	  example	  of	  the	  two	  spheres	  a	  mile	  apart	   (Black	   [1952];	   see	   Lowe	   op.cit.),	   we	   may	   say	   that	   if	   we	   model	   them	   within	   a	  framework	   such	   as	   ZF,	   there	   is	   no	   way	   out:	   they	   become	   individuals,	   and	   cannot	   be	  simply	   weakly	   discernible,	   as	   some	   want	   to	   say,	   independently	   either	   we	   can	  (qualitatively	   or	   not)	   discern	   them	   or	   not	   (Lowe	   ibid.).	   Logic	   forces	   this	   conclusion.	  
Thus,	  Lowe’s	  argumentation,	  according	  to	  which	  “[i]f	  there	  are	  indeed	  two	  spheres	  and	  
two	  electrons	  [he	  is	  mentioning	  the	  two	  electrons	  of	  an	  Helium	  atom],	  then	  the	  spheres	  must	  be	  distinct	  spheres	  and	  the	  electrons	  distinct	  electrons.”	  This	  is	  true	  due	  to	  STI	  and	  the	  standard	  definitions	  of	  cardinal	  numbers,	  but,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  two	  objects	  are	  two,	  this	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  they	  must	  be	  distinct!	  	  	  Summing	  up,	  due	  to	  the	  argumentation	  we	  shall	  still	  present	  below,	  in	  order	  to	  correctly	  take	  into	  account	  non-­‐individuals,	  we	  need	  to	  change	  the	  logical	  framework.	  But,	  some	  may	  say,	  the	  language	  of	  ZF	  is	  so	  powerful	  that	  we	  can	  do	  the	  job	  within	  ZF	  in	  some	  way.	  This	   is	   correct,	   but	   the	   road	   is	   full	   of	  mathematical	   tricks	  we	   regard	   are	   far	   from	   the	  philosophical	  and	  metaphysical	  interest	  in	  considering	  legitimate	  non	  individuals.	  Let	  us	  see	  why.	  	  	  
Non-­individuality	  in	  a	  standard	  setting,	  or	  the	  existence	  of	  “ersatz”	  non-­
individuals	  in	  ZF	  Let	  us	  fix	  some	  criteria	  for	  something	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐individual.	  Lowe	  says	  that	  it	  suffices	  that	   they	   fail	   to	   obey	   at	   least	   one	   of	   his	   conditions.	   But,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   Lowe	   also	  considers	   that	   given	   any	   two	   objects,	   by	   the	   simple	   fact	   that	   they	   are	   two,	   they	   are	  necessarily	  distinct.	  This	  is	  in	  accordance,	  for	  instance,	  with	  the	  approach	  proposed	  by	  Dorato	  and	  Morganti	   [2012]	  concerning	  quantum	  ontology,	  and	  perhaps	  also	  by	  other	  people.	   But	   this	   claim	   is	   simply	   not	   necessarily	   true.	   The	   best	  we	   can	   say	   is	   that	   this	  claim	  holds	  good	  in	  ZF	  or	  in	  any	  theory	  of	  a	  standard	  fashion,	  encompassing	  STI	  and	  the	  standard	  notion	  of	   cardinal.	  However,	  we	  may	   still	   ask,	  why	   should	  we	  be	  working	   in	  ZF?	  In	  a	  forthcoming	  paper,	  we	  have	  shown	  that	  by	  using	  quasi-­set	  theory	  we	  can	  define	  collections	  (quasi-­‐sets)	  having	  cardinality	  greater	  that	  one	  but	  whose	  elements	  cannot	  be	   discerned	   one	   from	   each	   other	   in	   any	   way	   (Arenhart	   and	   Krause	   [2012],	  forthcoming).	  As	  we	  are	  insisting,	  the	  issue	  depends	  heavily	  on	  the	  logico-­‐mathematical	  framework	   we	   are	   working	   in,	   and	   for	   certain	   purposes	   –as	   of	   course	   the	   ones	  concerning	  ontological	  disputes	  on	  identity	  and	  individuality-­‐-­‐	  this	  framework	  must	  be	  rigorously	  specified.	  	  	  To	   make	   clear	   what	   the	   proposal	   of	   rigorous	   specification	   of	   the	   underlying	   logic	  amounts	   to	  and	   to	   show	  how	   it	  bears	  on	   the	   issue	  of	   identity	  and	   individuality,	   let	  us	  proceed	  as	   follows.	  Firstly,	  we	  shall	  see	  how	  we	  can	  “simulate”	  non-­‐individuals	  within	  ZF,	   so	   defining	   what	   we	   can	   call	   ersatz	   non-­individuals.	   Then	   we	   turn	   to	   a	  characterization	  of	  truly	  non-­individuals.	  	  	  Suppose	  we	  are	  working	  in	  first-­‐order	  ZF.	  By	  a	  structure	  we	  mean	  an	  ordered	  pair	  E	  =	  
〈D,	   Ri〉	   (i∈I)	   comprising	   a	   non-­‐empty	   set	   D	   (the	   domain,	  which	   can	   be	   the	   reunion	   of	  other	  sets	  whose	  elements	  may	  be	  subsets	  of	  some	  considered	  sets),	  and	  a	  collection	  of	  n-­‐ary	   relations	   on	   D.	   This	   definition	   is	   quite	   general,	   and	   does	   not	   encompass	   just	  relations	  whose	  relata	  are	  individuals	  of	  some	  set.	  Our	  relations	  may	  be	  of	  higher-­‐order	  (by	  the	  way,	  this	  is	  another	  mistake	  made	  by	  philosophers,	  for	  the	  structures	  which	  are	  relevant	  for	  science	  and	  even	  for	  mathematics	  –topological	  spaces,	  well-­‐ordered	  sets—are	  not	  “first-­‐order”	  structures),	  but	  we	  do	  not	  lose	  generality	  if	  we	  consider	  just	  these	  “first-­‐order”	  structures,	  which	  we	  prefer	  to	  call	  “order-­‐1”	  structures.	  An	  automorphism	  of	  E	  is	  a	  bijection	  function	  h	  from	  D	  into	  D	  such	  that	  for	  any	  x,y∈D,	  xRiy	  iff	  h(x)Rih(y).	  	  If	  the	   only	   automorphism	   of	   E	   is	   the	   identity	   function	   (which	   of	   course	   is	   an	  automorphism	   of	   E),	   then	   E	   is	   a	   rigid	   structure.	   Two	   individuals	   a	   and	   b	   of	   D	   are	   E-­‐
indiscernible	  if	  there	  is	  an	  automorphism	  h	  of	  E	  such	  that	  h(a)=b.	  Otherwise,	  they	  are	  E-­‐discernible.	  For	  instance,	  consider	  the	  additive	  group	  of	  the	  integers,	  A	  =	  〈Z,	  +〉,	  where	  Z	  is	  the	  set	  of	  integers	  and	  +	  is	  a	  ternary	  relation	  on	  Z	  (the	  binary	  operation	  of	  addition).	  Thus	   A	   has	   two	   automorphisms,	   namely,	   the	   identity	   function	   and	   h:Z→Z	   defined	   by	  h(x)	   =	   −x,	   as	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see.	   Then,	   for	   any	   n∈Z,	   we	   have	   that	   n	   and	   −n	   are	   A-­‐indiscernible.	   In	  other	  words,	   inside	  the	  structure	  or,	  as	  we	  may	  say,	   from	  the	   internal	  point	   of	   view,	   nothing	   distinguish	   between	   n	   and	   −n,	   for	   instance,	   2	   and	   −2	   are	   A-­‐indiscernible.	   But	   of	   course	   they	   are	   distinct!	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   their	   distinction	  cannot	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  inside	  of	  the	  structure	  A.	  If	  we	  leave	  A,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  difference.	  But,	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  “to	  leave”	  a	  structure?	  In	  the	  sample	  case,	  we	  can	  add	  to	  A	  one	  new	   relation	   <,	   getting	   an	   extended	   structure	   A’=	   〈Z,	   +,	   <〉,	   and	   in	   this	   structure,	   the	  integers	   n≠0	   and	   −n	   are	   no	   more	   A’-­‐indiscernible,	   for	   −2<2	   but	   not	   the	   other	   way	  around.	  The	  structure	  A’	  is	  rigid.	  The	  fact	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  theorem	  of	  ZF	  that	  any	  structure	  
build	  in	  ZF	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  a	  rigid	  structure.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  always	  “leave”	  a	  ZF	   structure	   E	   in	   order	   to	   discern	   the	   E-­‐indiscernible	   elements.	   If	   we	   call	   the	   E-­‐indiscernible	  elements	  non-­‐individuals	  (better	  to	  say	  E-­‐non-­‐individuals),	  we	  find	  a	  way	  to	  treat	  this	  concept	  within	  ZF,	  vindicating	  the	  above	  claim	  about	  the	  expressive	  power	  of	   its	   language.	  So,	  by	  means	  of	  some	  mathematical	  trick,	  we	  can	  indeed	  simulate	  non-­‐individuality	   within	   standard	   logical	   frameworks,	   but	   in	   our	   opinion	   this	   is	   a	  philosophical	  sin	  if	  we	  strongly	  believe	  that	  right,	  true	  non-­‐individuals	  exist	  (see	  below).	  	  	  The	  above	  technique	  of	  simulating	  indiscernibility	  (and	  non-­‐individuality)	  is	  exactly	  that	  used	   in	   the	   standard	   quantum	   formalism.	   And	   of	   course	   we	   could	   not	   do	   anything	  different,	  for	  our	  standard	  languages	  are	  objectual,	  made	  to	  speak	  of	  individuals.	  Let	  us	  exemplify	  with	  quantum	  physics.	  The	  two	  electrons	  in	  a	  Helium	  	  atom	  are	  firstly	  named	  
a	  and	  b,	  and	  then	  we	  make	  a	  trick	  to	  veil	  this	  distinction,	  namely,	  using	  anti-­‐symmetric	  functions	  (and	  symmetric	   functions	   in	   the	  case	  of	  bosons),	  such	  as	  (being	   the	  spin	   the	  property	  being	  considered),	  |ψab〉	  =	  1/√2	  (|ψaup〉|ψbdown〉	  	  –	  |ψbup〉|ψadown〉)	  This	   function	   changes	   sign	   if	  we	   permute	   the	   labels,	   but	   its	   square,	   namely,	  ⏐|ψab〉⏐2,	  that	  gives	  the	  relevant	  probabilities,	  remains	  the	  same.	  Done!	  The	  indiscernibility	  of	  the	  electrons	   is	   born	   to	   light.	   But,	   recall	   that,	   within	   ZF,	   being	   two,	   they	   are	   discernible.	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  speak	  otherwise,	  we	  need	  either	  to	  introduce	  some	  new	  kind	  of	  hidden	  variables,	  perhaps	  of	  a	  “logical	  nature”,	  or	   to	   leave	  the	  standard	   formalism.	  Due	  to	   the	  difficulty	  with	  the	  former,	  which	  resembles	  the	  need	  of	  specifying	  the	  substratum	  in	  the	  substratum	  theories,	  we	  prefer	  to	  take	  the	  second	  option	  very	  seriously	  into	  account.	  	  	  	  
Non-­individuals	  Our	  intuitive	  view	  of	  non-­‐individuals	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  as	  follows.	  They	  would	  be	  such	  as	   the	   Smiths	   in	   the	   film	  Matrix,	  when	  Mr.Smith,	   really	   a	  program	  computer,	  multiply	  himself	   in	   hundreds	   to	   capture	   the	   good	   guy,	   Neo.	   During	   the	   childhood	   of	   one	   of	   us	  (DK),	  there	  was	  a	  cartoon	  called	  The	  Impossibles	  in	  a	  TV	  series	  where	  one	  of	  the	  good	  guys	  was	  the	  Multi-­‐Man,	  who	  could	  multiply	  himself	  at	  will.	  	  	  
	  The	  Multi-­‐Man,	  by	  Hanna-­‐Barbera.	  	  But,	   you	   could	   say,	   two	   replicas	   of	   the	   Multi-­‐Man,	   or	   of	   Mr.	   Smith,	   occupy	   distinct	  locations	  in	  space	  and	  time,	  so	  they	  can	  be	  distinguished.	  Independently	  of	  the	  notions	  of	  space	  and	  time,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  this	  is	  right.	  But	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  two	  duplicates	  of	  the	  Multi-­‐Man	  are	  to	  be	  indiscernible,	  so	  if	  they	  change	  position,	  nothing	  changes	  at	  all	  (at	  least	  this	  is	  the	  idea).	  The	  same	  happens	  with	  electrons	  or	  with	  quantum	  objects	  in	  general,	  yet	  they	  sometimes	  (depending	  on	  the	  interpretation	  or	  the	  theory)	  cannot	  be	  considered	  as	  little	  balls	  as	  the	  Multi-­‐Man	  can,	  at	  least	  from	  a	  topological	  point	  of	  view).	  The	  very	  nature	  of	  quantum	  objects	  is	  not	  in	  the	  discussion	  now;	  the	  only	  fact	  we	  want	  to	  fix	  concerning	  them	  is	  that	  they	  are	  invariant	  under	  permutations,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  fact	   that	   they	  may	   be	   (sometimes)	   considered	   as	   ones	   and	  distinguishable	   (instead	   of	  Lowe’s	   “distinct”)	   from	   others	   of	   similar	   species.	   Important	   to	   remark	   that	   there	   is	   a	  theory	  of	  multisets	  where	  the	  collections	  (the	  multisets)	  may	  have	  several	  copies	  of	  the	  
same	  object.	  For	  instance,	  the	  multiset	  {1,1,2,3,3,3}	  has	  cardinal	  6,	  and	  not	  3	  as	  if	  it	  were	  an	   object	   of	   ZF.	   But	   in	   this	   theory	   STI	   also	   holds,	   so	   the	   two	   ‘1s’	   are	   really	   the	   same	  mathematical	   object,	   although	   counted	   twice	   in	   this	   case.	   But	   we	   do	   not	   regard	   a	  collection	  of	  indiscernible	  quanta	  as	  composed	  of	  replicas	  of	  the	  same	  entity,	  yet	  we	  can	  also	   find	   an	   interpretation	   of	   them	   in	   terms	   of	   multisets	   (for	   a	   discussion	   involving	  quasi-­‐sets	  and	  multisets,	  see	  Krause	  [1991]).	  	  	  Thus,	   let	   us	   characterize	   (metaphysically)	   non-­‐individuals	   as	   entities/	   objects/	  particulars	  having	  the	  following	  characteristics	  (partially	  based	  on	  Lowe	  op.cit.):	  a	  non-­‐individual	   is	   an	   x	   such	   that	   (i)	   it	   counts	   as	   one	   entity,	   (ii)	   is	   does	   not	   have	   a	   definite	  identity	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  x	  does	  not	  obey	  STI,	   	   (iii)	  but	  x	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  discernible	  from	  non-­‐individual	  y	   in	   certain	   circumstances	  and	   indiscernible	   from	  y	   in	  others,	   and	  (iv)	  any	  permutation	  of	  non-­‐individuals	  of	  the	  same	  kind	  does	  not	  conduce	  to	  a	  different	  state	  of	  affairs.	  	  	  Indistinguishable	  quantum	  objects,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  quantum	  theory,	  fit	  these	  conditions,	  either	   if	   they	  are	  described	  by	  non-­‐relativistic	  quantum	  mechanics	  or	  by	   the	  quantum	  field	  theories.	  Obedience	  to	  quantum	  statistics	  means	  exactly	  this,	  if	  we	  regard	  “state	  of	  affairs”	   as	   the	   relevant	   probabilities.	   But	   note	   that	   in	   (iii)	   we	   have	   said	   that	   non-­‐individuals	   may	   be	   discerned	   from	   another	   non-­‐individual,	   and	   not	   that	   they	  may	   be	  
different	   or	   distinct	   from	   another	   non-­‐individual.	   This	   is	   consonant	   with	   item	   (ii)	   for	  otherwise	   we	   would	   be	   committed	   to	   STI.	   So,	   we	   prefer	   not	   to	   speak	   of	   identity,	  
difference,	  distinctness	  or	  whatever	  expression	  that	  connotes	  commitment	  to	  STI.	  	  	  Can	  non-­‐individuals	  be	  counted?	  As	  usually	  understood,	  to	  count	  a	  collection	  with,	  say,	  five	  objects	  (again	  we	  shall	  be	  restricted	  to	  the	  finite	  case)	  is	  to	  define	  a	  bijection	  from	  the	   collection	   in	   question	   to	   the	   ordinal	   6={0,1,2,3,4,5}.	   But	   this	   entails	   that	   the	  considered	  collection	  must	  be	  a	  set	  of,	  say,	  ZF,	  that	  is,	  as	  put	  long	  time	  ago	  by	  Cantor,	  “a	  
collection	   into	   a	  whole	   of	   definite,	  distinct	  objects	   of	   our	   intuition	   or	   of	   our	   thought”	  (italics	  added)	  (Cantor	  [1958],	  p.85).	  In	  fact,	  if	  we	  cannot	  distinguish	  among	  the	  objects	  being	  counted,	  we	  cannot	  define	  the	  bijection	  (as	  Russell	  [1940]	  had	  already	  informally	  pointed	  out;	  see	  pp.	  102-­‐103).	  But,	  at	   least	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  quantum	  theory,	  we	  do	  not	   need	   to	   count	   electrons,	   say.	   We	   need	   to	   know	   how	  many	   there	   are	   in	   a	   certain	  collection	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  say	  in	  the	  shell	  2p	  of	  a	  Sodium	  atom	  1s22s22p63s1.	  The	  six	   electrons	   are	   indistinguishable,	   yet	   they	   obey	   Pauli’s	   principle.	   Despite	   the	  differences	  in	  their	  quantum	  numbers,	  nothing	  can	  tell	  us	  which	  is	  which.	  This	  does	  not	  matter.	  The	  important	  thing	   is	  the	  cardinal	  of	   the	  collection.	  But	  sometimes	  we	  have	  a	  sense	  in	  saying	  that	  we	  can	  count	  them.	  For	  instance,	  suppose	  a	  neutral	  Helium	  atom.	  By	  ionization,	  we	  can	  make	  the	  atom	  lose	  one	  of	  its	  electrons,	  and	  we	  can	  name	  it	  a.	  Thus,	  the	  electron	  that	  remains	  is	  electron	  b.	  So,	  some	  would	  say,	  a≠b,	  and	  this	  again	  commits	  us	  with	  STI.	  What	   is	   the	  problem?	  The	  problem	  is	   that	  by	   ionization,	  we	  can	  make	  the	  atom	  neutral	  again,	  and	  the	  two	  electrons,	  b	  and	  the	  new	  one	  (is	  it	  a?)	  will	  be	  entangled	  and,	  according	  to	  quantum	  theory,	  nothing	  can	  tell	  which	  is	  which.	  But,	  if	  they	  obey	  STI,	  they	  would	  retain	   their	   individuality	  and	   the	  distinction	  would	  exist.	  Since	  we	  are	  not	  disposed	   to	   assume	   hidden	   variables,	   the	   best	   thing	   is	   to	   say	   that	   there	   are	   no	  differences	   to	  be	   restored:	   the	   important	   thing	   is	   that	   the	  neutral	   atom	  has	  again	   two	  electrons,	  and	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  be	  worried	  with	  their	  individuality.	  	  	  
A	  positive	  proposal	  	  Identity	  and	  its	  metaphysical	  consequences	  could	  be	  suppressed	  from	  the	  philosophical	  discussion	  about	  quantum	  objects,	  and	  perhaps	  about	  objects	  in	  general,	  remaining	  only	  at	  a	  metatheoretical	  level.	  Before	  we	  comment	  these	  issues	  at	  the	  quantum	  level,	  let	  us	  comment	   on	   “standard”	   objects	   first.	   We	   think	   that	   Hume	   is	   right	   in	   saying	   that	   we	  attribute	   identity	   to	  an	  object	  by	  habit	   (Hume	  [1986];	   see	  Krause	  and	  Becker	   [2006]).	  The	  person	  we	  are	  looking	  at	  just	  now	  and	  who	  we	  have	  met	  for	  the	  last	  time	  years	  ago	  is	   of	   course	   “different”	   from	   the	   person	   that	   she	  was,	   having	  modified	   her	   traces	   and	  acquired	   new	   experiences.	   But	   she	   is	   indeed	   “the	   same”	   friend	   of	   ours.	   There	   is	   no	  contradiction	  here.	  The	  fact	  is	  that	  if	  we	  accept	  that	  our	  friend	  (and	  we	  too)	  obey	  STI,	  we	  
must	  say	  that	  we	  both	  have	  changed	  and	  consequently	  we	  are	  distinct	  from	  ourselves	  of	  some	  years	  ago:	  the	  two	  persons	  that	  meet	  today	  are	  not	  the	  same	  ones	  that	  have	  met	  some	  years	  ago	  for	  they	  have	  different	  properties	  than	  before.	  Remember	  that	  classical	  logic	   does	   not	   involve	   time,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   necessary:	   suffice	   it	   to	   consider	   our	  “properties”.	   For	   the	   relationship,	   it	   is	   enough	   to	  acknowledge	   that	  we	  and	  our	   friend	  are	   indiscernible	   in	   many	   aspects	   from	   who	   we	   were	   some	   years	   ago.	   Identity	   is	   of	  course	  of	  a	  fundamental	  importance	  in	  mathematics;	  if	  my	  number	  2	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  
yours,	   we	   cannot	   discuss	   mathematics.	   But	   concerning	   people,	   chairs,	   clouds,	   and	  quantum	  objects,	   indiscernibility	   is	  enough.	  People	  are	  discernible	   from	  themselves	  of	  some	  time	  ago,	  and	  when	  time	  is	  short,	  such	  as	  a	  few	  nanoseconds	  (the	  time	  of	  a	  blink),	  they	  look	  as	  indiscernible	  from	  themselves,	  and	  all	  happens	  as	  if	  they	  are	  identical	  from	  the	  person	  of	  a	  time	  before	  (time,	  here,	  is	  a	  way	  of	  speech).	  Quantum	  objects	  fall	  under	  this	   category	  of	   objects:	   suffice	   to	   say	   that,	   in	   the	   above	   case	   of	   the	  Helium	  atom,	   the	  electron	  released	  from	  the	  atom	  by	  ionization	  and	  the	  electron	  that	  remains	  in	  the	  atom	  are	  discernible,	  and	  not	  necessarily	  distinct,	  which	  would	  commit	  us	  with	  STI	  (or	  with	  some	   other	   theory	   of	   identity).	   Concerning	   the	   electron	   that	   was	   released	   and	   that	  which	  was	  captured	  by	  the	  ion,	  since	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  does	  not	  change	  at	  all	  between	  the	  “first”	  neutral	  atom	  and	  the	  “second”,	  we	  may	  say	   that	   they	  are	   indiscernible	   (and	  not	  that	  they	  are	  “identical”).	  	  
	  Of	   course	   we	   do	   not	   need	   to	   change	   our	   terminology	   and	   ways	   of	   speaking;	   we	   can	  continue	  to	  say	  that	  our	  friend	  we	  meet	  today	  is	  the	  same	  person	  we	  have	  met	  years	  ago	  for	   the	   last	   time.	   But	  we	   should	   acknowledge	   that	   this	   is	   an	   abuse	   of	   language.	   If	  we	  apply	  STI,	  we	  will	  be	  in	  trouble.	  Concerning	  non-­‐individuals,	  they	  can	  be	  discernible	  or	  indiscernible,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   of	   a	   same	   kind,	   say	   electrons.	   Bosons	   in	   a	   BEC	   could	  perhaps	  exemplify	  better	  the	  indiscernibility	  of	  non-­‐individuals,	  but	  entangled	  electrons	  do	   the	   job	   as	   well.	   Summing	   up,	   we	   think	   that	   the	   philosophical	   discourse	   would	   be	  simplified	  in	  much	  if	  we	  simply	  drop	  the	  notion	  of	   identity	  (as	   linked	  to	  STI)	  from	  our	  logic	   and	   assume	   a	  weaker	   notion	   of	   indiscernibility	   instead.	   In	   this	   sense,	   all	   objects	  turn	   to	   be	   non-­‐individuals	   according	   to	   the	   given	   definitions,	   but	   still	   “objects	   of	  discourse”.	  	  	  How	  can	  we	  deal	  with	  non-­‐individuals,	  either	  discernible	  or	  indiscernible?	  How	  can	  we	  put	  together	  our	  proposal	  with	  common	  language	  and	  reference	  demanding	  uniqueness	  in	  cases	  where	  we	  speak	  about	  “the”	  electron	  released	  by	  ionization?	  Is	   it	  not	  the	  case	  that	   definite	   descriptions,	   naming	   and	   reference	   to	   particular	   objects	   in	   general	   need	  identity,	  at	  least	  self-­‐identity	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Jacquette	  [2011])?	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  full	  account	  of	  how	  reference	  should	  work,	  but	  we	  believe	  that	  uniqueness	  conditions	  may	  be	  freed	  from	  identity	  by	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  cardinal.	  Really,	  in	  quantum	  mechanics	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  say	  that	  there	  are	  n	  items	  without	  needing	  to	  count	   them,	   or	   to	   establish	   their	   identities	   (for	   the	   counting	   relation	   and	   cardinal	  attribution,	  see	  Arenhart	  and	  Krause	  [2012],	  forthcoming).	  That	  would	  do	  the	  job	  quite	  well,	  but	  as	  we	  mentioned,	   this	   is	  only	  a	  sketch	  of	  how	  things	  may	  be	  adapted	  to	  non-­‐individuals.	  	  	  Still	   concerning	   individuals	   and	   cardinals,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   say	   that,	   once	   non-­‐individuals	  should	  count	  as	  one,	   they	  may	  also	   form	  collections	  with	  cardinal	  1,	  but	   in	  this	   case	   we	   cannot	   distinguish	   between	   two	   unitary	   collections	   of	   indistinguishable	  non-­‐individuals	  of	  the	  same	  species.	  Such	  collections	  (which	  by	  their	  turn	  also	  count	  as	  two)	  can	  have	  a	  cardinal,	  but	  not	  an	  associated	  ordinal.	  These	  collections,	  which	  we	  term	  
quasi-­sets	  may	  be	  also	  indiscernible,	  namely,	  when	  they	  have	  the	  same	  cardinal	  and	  the	  quantity	  (given	  by	  cardinals)	  of	  elements	  of	  one	  kind	  are	  the	  same.	  Furthermore,	  these	  collections	  must	  still	  remain	  indiscernible	  from	  an	  original	  one	  when	  one	  of	  its	  elements	  is	  exchanged	  (in	  some	  way)	  by	  an	  indiscernible	  one,	  as	  it	  happens	  with	  the	  atoms	  in	  the	  ionization	  processes	  mentioned	  above.	  	  Collections	  with	  such	  properties	  (quasi-­sets)	  can	  be	  considered	  within	  quasi-­set	  theory,	  but	  we	  shall	  not	  develop	  it	  here	  (see	  French	  and	  Krause	  [2006],	  [2010]).	  	  	  
Conclusions	  Identity	   is	  one	  of	   the	   invariants	  we	  use	   to	  construct	  a	  view	  of	   the	  world	   (Schrödinger	  [1964]).	  Things	   seem	   to	  be	   individuals.	  Thus,	  when	  we	   face	  objects	  of	   some	  kind	   that	  appear	   to	   violate	   this	   condition,	   we	   become	   suspicious	   that	   something	   wrong	   is	  happening	   and	   try	   to	   accommodate	   what	   we	   face	   within	   our	   previous	   frameworks.	  Physicists	  are	  making	   these	  moves	  when	   they	  use	  standard	  mathematics	  and	  classical	  logic	  (encompassing	  STI)	  in	  what	  respects	  the	  indiscernibility	  of	  quantum	  objects	  (recall	  the	  use	  of	  the	  anti-­‐symmetric	  function	  as	  exemplified	  above),	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  aware	  of	  that.	  We	  propose	  something	  different.	  In	  believing	  that	  our	  logic	  and	  our	  mathematics	  should	  be	  compatible	  with	  our	  metaphysics,	  and	  in	  accepting	  a	  metaphysics	  where	  non-­‐
individuals	  are	  possibilities,	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  have	  strong	  arguments	  favouring	  the	  idea	  of	   looking	   for	  a	  different	   formalism	  to	  cope	  not	  only	  with	  our	   intuitions,	  but	  also	  with	  observed	  quantum	  facts,	  a	  formalism	  which	  could	  cope	  with	  discernible	  non-­‐individuals	  (playing	  the	  role	  of	  individuals	  in	  certain	  circumstances),	  individuals	  properly	  speaking	  (such	   as	   mathematical	   objects	   like	   numbers),	   and	   of	   course	   indiscernible	   non-­‐individuals.	   	   We	   can	   do	   it	   by	   eliminating	   identity	   for	   some	   objects	   of	   our	   discourse,	  although	  it	  can	  be	  maintained	  for	  certain	  objects.	  Thus,	  as	  a	  primitive	  concept,	  we	  may	  use	  a	  weaker	  notion	  of	  indiscernibility,	  or	  indistinguishability,	  so	  exchanging	  “=”	  by	  “≡”	  (an	  equivalence	   relation),	  but	   contrary	   to	   identity,	   the	   substitutivity	   rule	  doesn’t	  hold.	  That	   is,	   indiscernible	   objects	   cannot	   be	   substituted	   one	   each	   other	   salva	   veritate	   in	  whatever	  context	  (but	  just	  in	  some	  of	  them).	  	  	  But,	  you	  may	  say,	   in	   refusing	  substitutivity,	  you	  are	   just	  eliminating	   the	  very	   intuition	  regarding	   quantum	   objects,	   namely,	   that	   the	   expectation	   value	   (roughly,	   the	  probabilities)	  do	  not	  change	  when	  a	  quantum	  object,	  say	  an	  electron,	   is	  substituted	  by	  “another”	  one!	  	  Of	  course,	  this	  is	  the	  right	  conclusion	  by	  the	  moment.	  In	  fact,	  to	  suppose	  the	  failure	  of	  substitutivity	  was	  the	  way	  we	  have	  found	  to	  make	  indiscernibility	  distinct	  from	  identity.	  It	  is	  only	  an	  equivalence	  relation.	  Concerning	  permutations,	  we	  can	  reason	  as	   follows:	   quasi-­‐set	   theory	   encompasses	   certain	   quasi-­‐sets	   of	   objects	   which	   can	   be	  indiscernible	  (no	  identity	  criteria	  exist	  for	  them)	  but	  that	  have	  a	  certain	  cardinal.	  It	  is	  a	  theorem	   of	   the	   theory	   that	   if	   we	   “exchange”	   (by	   the	   set-­‐theoretical	   operations)	   an	  element	   of	   the	   collection	   by	   another	   one	   which	   is	   not	   in	   the	   collection	   (it	   is	   not	   a	  
different	   one,	   but	   a	   distinguishable	   one),	   the	   new	   collection	   remains	   indistinguishable	  from	  the	  original	  one	  (yes,	  the	  indistinguishability	  relation	  applies	  also	  for	  collections)	  -­‐-­‐-­‐see	   French	   and	   Krause	   [2010],	   Th.3.1).	   This	   way	   of	   expressing	   the	   permutation	  invariance,	   anyway,	   seems	   to	   be	   in	   closer	   connection	  with	   quantum	  mechanics.	   If	  we	  regard	  the	  collection	  of	  the	  electrons	  of	  the	  outer	  shell	  of	  a	  certain	  neutral	  atom	  as	  being	  represented	   by	   a	   quasi-­‐set,	   the	   exchanging	   of	   electrons	   by	   ionization	   may	   be	  represented	   by	   the	   (quasi)set-­‐theoretical	   operations	   in	   accordance	   with	   quasi-­‐set	  theory.	  	  Furthermore,	   in	   eliminating	   identity,	   we	   can	  maintain	   Lowe’s	   first	   condition,	   namely,	  that	   the	   considered	   object	   (a	   non-­‐individual)	   is	   a	   unity.	   Really,	   we	   wish	   to	   make	  reference,	   and	   speak,	   of	   the	   electron	   being	   released	   from	   an	   atom	  by	   ionization.	   	   The	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  keep	  its	  identity	  after	  he	  has	  merged	  with	  other	  electrons,	  say	  in	  the	  environment.	  If	  we	  regard	  it	  as	  an	  individual,	  we	  need	  to	  conform	  it	  to	  the	  STI	  and	  then	  all	  the	  above	  undesirable	  consequences	  enter	  again	  by	  the	  back	  door.	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